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DESTROYERS FOR NAVAL BASES:
HIGHLIGHTS OF AN UNPRECEDENTED TRADE
William H. Langenberg
Introduction. In early Septemher
] 940, the world was in a turmoil. The
BatLle of Britain was nearing its climax,
and elsewhere throughout the globe
international tension ran high. Election
year strife was just heginning to augment the furor of isolationist-interventionist clashes in the United States. This
background provided a filling setting
for the transmission of the following
message to Congress by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 13 September:
I transmit herewith for the information of the Congress notes exchanged between the British Ambassador at Wm;hington and the
Seeretary of State on September
2, 1940, under whieh this GovernII1rnt has acquired the right to
Ica!'r naval and air bases in Newfoundland, and in the islands of
Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaiea,
Sl. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua,
and in British Guiana; also a copy

of an opinion of the Attorney
General dated August 27, 1940,
regarding my authority to cr>nsummate this arrangement.
The right to hases in Newfoundland and Bermuda are gifts-generously given and gladly received.
Thc othcr hases mentioned have
heen acquired in exchange for
fifty of our old destroyers ... 1.
This action by the President created
a hcated controversy. Its legality and
neutrality were openly questioned, and
the sub rosa nature of .the associated
negotiations was severely criticized.
Howevcr, as dramatic events in Europe
and activities of a national election
began to dominate newspaper spaee, the
furor aroused by the deal gradually
suhsidcd.
Contemporary World Events. In
ordcr to view the destroyers-naval basco
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trade in proper perspective. a brief
review of contemporary world events
seems desirable.
From the time of the defeat of
Poland until April J 940, the European
conflict was ill a state of relative inactivity. On 9 April] 940, however, this
temporary stalemate elided. Germany
launched a blitzkrieg attaek on Norway
and Denmark which appalled the world
by its startling success. One month later,
on 10 i\lav 19-1-0, the invasions of
Belgium, ~iolland, Luxemhourg, and
France began.
On the day thc Germans marched
into th e Low COllntries, Nevillc
Chamherlain resigned his post as Great
Britain's Prime i\ linister. Jle was succeeded hy Winston Churchill, who immediately formed a new coalition
Cahinet and prepared to lead his nation
through its gravest crisis.
Meanwhile, the Nazi offensive made
rapid advances. On 14 May the Duteh
Army surrendered, and the German
assault turned westward toward the
classic battlefields of northern France.
Armored mobile columns cut through
north of the Somme to the English
Channel. From therc they proeeeded
northeastward to the Channel portswithin sight of Britain itself. I n only 11
days the Germans had a('compli!'hcd
what they had failed to do in 4 years of
hitter fighting during World War L
This was a brilliantly executcd military campaign. It had an important
secondary effed of creating panic and
demoralization among the Allied forees.
On 28 May, King Leopold of Belgium
surrendered. The French Commandcr in
Chief, Gcncral Weygand, attempted to
form a line of defcnse at the Somme.
This tadic was unsucees..c;ful. On 4 June
the British Expeditionary Force was
eva('uatl'd from Dunkirk. The Gt'rmalls
then tllrned south loward Paris.
Frane(' did not Ion/! surviv(\ IIH' Nazi
Pnris ("I'll on 1-'. .11111(', nnd :1
days Inter the Pl'lain govl'rIImcllt slIed

om;I~I\I/!hl.

for an armistice. Britain now stood
alone in opposition to the Nazi enemy.
Inception of an Idea. The idea of
procuring American warships for usc
ngain:::t Germany was first sugg($ted hy
French Prcmicr Paul Reynaud. llc wm;
cncouraged by thc announcement on 16
April 1940 that the Anglo-French Purchasing Commission, which was negotiating for American arms, could obtain
planes of almost any type then heing
produced for the military services in the
Unitcd States. 2 As a result, he sent to
Washington on 14 Maya rather startling
proposal that thc American Governmcnt
arrange for the "sale or lease of old
destroyers. "3
On the following day, Will!lton Churchill sent President Roosevelt au even
more breathtaking request. Titling himself "Former Naval Person," he wrotc:
All I ask now is that you should
proclaim non-belligerency, which
would mean that you would help
IlS with everything short of actually engaging armed forces. Immediate needs are: First of all, thc
loan of forty or fifty of your
older destroyers ... 4
This cahle from Chun:hill ww; tlw
first he had sent to Roosevelt since
becoming Prime Minister. It was also the
first of a series whieh dealt with the
subject of procuring American destroyers. These messages were to have considerahle influence on consummating
the trade.
Initial American Reaction. The initial
reaction by President Roosevelt to the
requests for destroyers was not encouraging to the Allies. On 16 May he
rabled Churchill that the loan or gift of
IIH' vesgrls would require ... "the Sll(~
eific authorization of til(! Conp;rc!lg anell
alii not c(\rtain that it would LI(~ wise for
thal sU!rgestion to he made to the
Congress at this moment."5 To William
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Bullitt, American Ambassador in Paris,
he cabled that:
Any exchange of American destroyers probably inacceptable because of enormous sea areas which
must be patrolled by us and
would require Congressional action which might be very difficult
to get. Our old destroyers cannot
be sold as obsolete as is proved by
fact, all of them are now in
commission and in use or are in
process of being commissioncd for
actual use. 6
l3ut this initial negative reaction did
not last for long..The capitulation of the
Low Countries, soon followed hy thc
evacuation of Dunkirk and the armistice
appeal by France, imparted a ~ense of
urgency to the administration's program
for aiding Britain by the sale or Ica~e of
war material. The transfer of destroyers
began to appear in a new light.
Significant Developments-June
1940. By June 1940, favorable sentiment toward aiding England "by any
means short of war" was prevalent in
the inner cireles of the Roosevelt administration. Only two Cabinet members,
Secretary of War· Harry Woodring and
Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison,
were laggards in this respect. Harold
Ickes, controversial Secretary of the
Interior, was the first among this influential group to urge the President to
send obsolete warships to Britain. On 5
June he advocated selling "some of our
obsolete airplanes and destroyers to
England and France.,,7 As yet, however,
President Roosevelt refused to be committed on the subject.
Legislative actions occurred during
.1 une which scrved both to facilitate and
hinder the ultimate trade. Senator i\lorris Sheppard of Texas, Chairman of the
Committee 011 i\liIitary Affairs, offt'red
all administration-sponl'ored ,111\('1\(1ment to one of the pending defense

bills. It authorized the War Department
to exchange uns{~rviceahle or surplus
materials for others of which then: was
a shortage. This was an attempt to
ex tend the "trade-in" method then used
to supply the Allies with aireraft. By
this system, "obsolete" planes were
"traded-in" to the manufacturers for
ncwer models. The older versions were
then shipped to Britain. Sena.tor Bennett Clark of Missouri, a vociferous
isolationist, declared that the amendment was "an evasion of international
law and of the Neutrality Act."8 Despite vigorous isolationist opposition,
however, this measure became law on 2
J!Jly.
Meanwhile, an apparent obstacle to
the destroyer transfer arose. Senator
David Walsh of Massachusetts, Chairman
of the Committee on Naval Affairs,
obtained passage on 2B June of an
amendment to the Naval Appropriations
BilI. This section stipulated that
no military or naval equipment of
any kind shall be disposed of by
sale, exchange, or in any other
manner unless the Chief of Staff
and the Chief of Naval Operations
first certify, for military and naval
equipment respectively, that the
property to be disP9sed of is not
essential to the defcnse of the
country.9
Another significant dcvelopment also
took place during this month. On 20
June, in a move ostensibly designed to
broaden the bipartisan nature of the
administration 's foreig~ policies, President Roosevelt appointed two Republicans to key Cabinet posts. Henry L.
Stimson was selected to rcplace Woodring as Secretary of War. Stimson, former Secretary of State under Prcsident
IIoover, had the reputation of favorin/!
strong l'upport for the Aflics. I~rank
Knox. who as.'Hlllwd Edison's ofrie!: as
S('erdary of the Navy, was the fortnl'r
puhlislu:r of the anti-New Deal, pro_uall
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aid short of war" Chicago Daily News.
While these events were occurring on
the domestic scene, the war in Europe
reached a critical stage for Britain. Italy
entered the conflict on 10 June, and the
threat of Italian submarines furthcr
jeopardized England's chances of survi·
val. Churchill expressed his fears and
reiterated his former request for de·
stroyers in a cable to Roosevelt on II
June:
I have already cabled you about
aeroplanes including flying boats
which are so needful to us in the
impending struggle for the life of
Great Britain. But even more
pressing is the need for destroyers.
Italian outrage makes it necessary
for us to cope with much larger
number of submarines which may
come out into the Atlantic and
perhaps be based on Spanish
ports. To this the only counlcr is
deslroyers. Nothing is so important as for us to have 30 or 40 old
destroyers you have already had
reconditioned. We ean fit them
very rapidly with our asdics and
they wiII bridge over the gap of 6
months before our wartime new
construction comes into play. We
will return them or their equivalents to you without fail at 6
months notice if at any time you
need them. The next 6 months are
vital ... Not a day should be
lost. 1 0
While these messages to Roosevelt
concerning Britain's need for destroyers
indicated the urgency of the siluation,
Churchill saved his trump card until
later. On 24 June he wrote to Mackenzie King in Canada and emphasized
the danger that, if England fell, there
was the possibility that "Hitler would
gel the Brilish fleet. ,,11 Four days laler,
in a cable lo J,ord Lothian, Brilain's
Ambassador to the Uniled Stales, he
Slated:

Never cease to impress on President and others that, if this country were successfully invaded and
largely occupied after heavy fighting, some Quisling Government
would be formed to make peace
on the basis of our becoming a
German Protectorate. In this case
the British Fleet would be the
solid contribution with which this
Peace Government would huy
terms. 12
These references to loss of Lhe British
Fleet served to bring England's crisis
closer to American thoughts. With the
world's largest navy at its disposal,
Germany might actually expand the war
to the shores of the United States.
A Trade is Conceived. The news that
Britain was seeking American destroyers
somehow leaked out to the press, and
expressions of opinion on the subject
began to appear. 3 On 12 June Ernest
K. Lindley, writing in his column for
the Washington Post and other newspapers, suggested America run the risk
of violating international law by convoying ships to England or, failing that,
by "selling a flock of old destroyers to
the British. ,,14 Public opinion was not
as y~t very strong on the subject,
however, largely through indifference
and lack of information.
Within the administration, the possibility of tran~ferring some destroyers
now hegan to be given more consideration. In early July, Joseph Alsop, another Washington correspondent, was a
guest for dinner at the British Embassy.
A staff member confided to him some
of the contents of Churchill's urgent
appeals to Roosevelt for destroyers.
Alsop, in turn, urged Benjamin Cohen,
special assistant to the Attorney General, to use all his influence in support
of the lransfer of ;'0 or 60 sueh warships to England. From his information
he fell that, without such naval reinforcement, Britain might not be able
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to hold the Channel against invasion. 1 5
Cohen brought this idea to Harold
Ickes, who. on 5 J nly "spent a lot of
time arguing with the President that, hy
hook or by crook, we oUfht to aeecdc
to England's request. "1
Roosevelt,
however, was now bound by the National Defense Aet of 28 June 1940. In
reply to Ickes, he stated that the destroyers eould not be transferred without a certification from the Navy that
they were useless for defense purposes.
In addition, he felt that such an action
would be difficult since the Navy was
reconditioning more than 100 of them
for its own usc. 1 7
For the United States, however, the
ramifications of a possible surrender of
the British Fleet now began to assume
grea ter significance. Lord Lothian
cabled Churchill on 6 July that American opinion was becoming aware of this
eventuality.IS Among the White House
advisers this fear also increased in magnitude. There was general agreement in
the administration that some means
Illust be found to bolster Britain's sea
defenses. But a feasible method to do
this was not immediately apparent.
Statutes and congressional opposition
stood in the way.
The temporary impasse was ended in
late July. For some time the Navy had
been anxious to obtain sea and air bases
on islands in the Atlantic and Caribbean. These were desired to safeguard
approaches to the Panama Canal and
strengthen hemispheric defense. Since
Britain held title to certain islands
which would be suited for this purpose,
the administration conceived the idea to
arrange some sort of exchange.
On 23 July President Roosevelt discussed this idea with Secretary of the
Navy Knox. The President expressed
opposition to taking title to the h;lands,
thl·n·by inhl·riting their political, l'lhnie,
and l'(!OnOlllic prohh·IlI~. lit· pn'ferre'd to
a:;k the Brith;h and Colonial Governmrnts to Ir:lsc till' sill':;.19 Roosevelt
made no attempt to specify the terms of

such agreements, hecause he felt these
could be arranged Inter. The President
asked Colonel Knox, who wm; dining
with Lord Lothian that evening, to
sound him out on the proposal. Lo-thian, in turn, was expected to get the
concurrelH:e of Churchill. With a basis
for negotiations thus established, the
trade began to develop more rapidly.
Negotiations Begin. On 31 July Churchill again cabled Roosevelt directly:
It has now become most urgent
for you to let us have the destroyers ... for which we have
asked ... We have a large construction of destroyers and antiU-hoat craft corning forward, but
the next 3 or 4 months open the
gap of which I _have previously
told you. Latterly the air attack
on our shores has become injurious ... Destroyers are frightfully
vulnerable to air bombing, and yet
they must be held in the air
bombing area to prevent seaborne
invasion ...
This is a frank account of our
present situation and I am confident, now that you know exactly
how we stand, that you will-Ieavc
nothing undonc to ensure that 50
or 60 of your oldest destroyers
are sent to me at once ... Mr.
President, with great respect, I
must tell you that in the long
history of the world this is a thing
to do now .•. 20
By this time Churchill's pleas were
receiving more attention. At the Cabinet
meeting on 2 August, the transfer of
destroyers was discussed at length. In
Roo~evelt'~ own words, there was imJllI!diatl' agn'('nll!nt that "tlw survival of
IIII! Brili~h Isles lIIuler (;('rnulII all;u:k
might vcry possibly (lepeJld OJI geLLiJlg
Ih('s(' de~lroyers." But he al~o recognized that Icgislation would be
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"necessary" to authorize any deal concerning the warships. The President felt
that, if the British Government would
give positive assurances that the British
Fleet ... "would not under any conceivable circumstances fall into the
hands of the Germans," the opposition
in Congress would be "greatly lessened."21
By early August the domestic political situation had also changed favorably
for approval of the destroyer transfer.
In June the Republican Convention had
broken with isolationist control. The
delegates had nominated an avowed
internationalist, Wendell WiIlkie, whose
ideas on assistance to Britain were "all
aid short of war." In July, Roosevelt
had accepted an unprecedented third
term nomination. Both parties now
attempted to appeal to the pro-English
sentiment of the voters.
In order to facilitate passage of the
necessary legislation through Congress,
the Cabinet decided at the 2 August
meeting to sound out Willkie's views on
the transfer. Roosevelt agreed to call
William Allen White, noted editor and
head of the Committee to Defend
America by Aiding the Allies. White,
who was friendly with WilIkie, was to
seek his approval, together with that of
Repuhlican congressional leaders, and
thus reduce the opposition to the measure. 22
.
Meanwhile, the proposal of exchanging naval bases for destroyers had
been transmitted to - Churchill by
Lothian. On 3 August Churchill replied
to his ambassador:
[The] second alternative, i.e.,
[granting of] bases [in British
possessions], is agreeable, but we
prefer that it should be on lease
indefinitely and not sale. It is
under~tood tlHlt this wiII enable us
to secure oestroyers and flying
hoats at onee. It is, as you say,
vital to sellie quickly. Now is the
time when we want the de-

stroyers ... Co ahead on these
lines full steam. 2 3
To the proposal for making a declaration regarding the disposition of the
British Fleet in ease of England's defeat,
however, Churchill demurred. He believed Britain ... "would not tolerate
any discussion of what we should do if
our island were overrun.,,2 4 Ina cable
to Lothian he stated:
... It would obviously be impossible for us to make or agree to
any declaration being made on
such a subject. I have repeatedly
warned you in my secret telegrams and those to the President
of the dangers United States
would run if 'Great Britain were
successfully invaded and a British
Quisling Govc'rIIment came into
office to make the best terms
possible for the surviving inhabitants. 1 am very glad to find
that these dangers are regarded tis
serious, and you should in no wise
minimize them. We have no intention of relieving United States
from any well grounded anxieties
on this point ... Pray make i~
dear at once thnt we could never
ngree to the Iilighl\!IiL (:Olllpromising of our full liherty of
ac~tion, nor tolerate any slH:h dc'fentist llllnouncement, the effeet
of which would be disastrous ... 2S
These developments limited the alternatives for any proposed destroyersnaval bases trade. Transfer of the warships was now coupled with the lease of
sites for naval and air bases in the
Caribbean and Atlantic.
Public Opinion Rises. i\ !though preliminary negotiations on the df'stroyer
deal were ostensihly slLb ro.~a, the possibility of such llction was wioely known
by early August. Attention was focused
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on the suhjeet on 4 August, when Gen.
John J. Pershing, Commander of the
American Expcditionary Force in World
War I, addressed the country on a
nationwide radio broadcast. Pershing
had been induced to make the speech
by William Allen White's Committee to
Defend America by Aiding the Allies. 26
He warned that "all the things wc hold
dear arc gravely threatened," and stated
that thc best way for the nation to
defend its heritage before it was too late
was to aid Britain in every way within
its power. The old warrior believed that
this could be done immediately by
providing the British or Canadian Governments "at least fifty of the overage
destroyers which arc left from the days
of the World War. "27
The urgency of Britain's needs
tended to change the opinion of certain
influential Americans concerning the
proposed warship transfer. Senator Key
Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Committce on Foreign Relations, announced
his support of the plan. In June, after
the fall of France, he had been so sure
that England would also topple before
the German onslaught that he deprecated "futile encouragemcnt to fight
on," and advised the Churchill government to abandon the British Isles to
Hitler and bring its navy across the
Atlantie. 28
Further evidences of popular support
for the idea were also brought forward.
Senator Alben Barkley, the administration's Senate leader, presented a petition signed by approximately 15,000
citizens of his own state of Kentucky
urging release of the destroyers to Great
Britain. 29 Influential newspapermen
began promoting the cause in print.
Thcse ineluded Washington columnists
Walter Lippman, Joseph Alsop, and
Rohert Allen: Frank R. Kf'nt of the
Baltimorc S",,: 1I11rry Bin/!:hllm and
IIl'rl)('rt A~lIr, I'uhli~her mill editor,
re~pe(:ti\'dy, of the Louisville Co"ric'rJournal: Geoffrey Pllr~()nS, ehief editorial writer of the New York Herald-

Tribune; Russell Davenport, former
editor of Fortune and now Willkie's
campaign manager;30 and thc previously mentioned Ernest K. Lindley and
William Allen White.
Probably the most significant survey
of public opinion on the subject was a
Gallup poll published in August. It
pointed out that England needed destroyer ships to replace those which had
bee~ damaged or sunk and that the
United States had some destroyers built
during the last World War which were
being put back into active service. Questioned whether the United States should
sell some of these ships to England, the
Gallup respondents re~lied: Yes, 61
percent; No, 39 percent. 1
But all sentiment on the destroyer
transfer was not favorable. Senator
David Walsh was convinced that releases
of the ships would not only violate
Federal law but would be an act of war.
There wcre also reports that high officers in the Navy Department believed
that transfer of the vessels would
weaken national defense.
A different sort of objection was
raised by the Dallas News. It was concerned with the secrecy surrounding the
entire transaction. In an open letter to
President Roosevelt, the paper stated:

... No citizen of this 'country can
be disinterested in the effect on
our future of a defeat for Great
Britain ... Aid-the most effective aid that the U.S. can render
without impairing our own national defense-may be unpopular
at the moment because men and
women do not understand thc
dire necessity. But if they were
told, sir, thcir support and their
conviction would be immediatc in
responsc. 32
TIIi~

increa~ed puhlie illtere~l ill the
destroycr trllnsfer tcnded to impart
grcatcr urgency to the negotiations.
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Progress is Made. As previously mentioned, Roosevelt had decided to ascertain Willkie's opinions on thc warship
transfcr before bringing the necessary
legislation before Congress. William
Allen White had been designated to
contact the Repuhlican candidate on
this subject. Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress and member of the
White House circle, was also involved.
MacLeish was friendly with Russell
Davenport, WiIlkie's campaign manager,
and acted through him in an attempt to
secure prior approval for the deal. i\ lacLeish and White succeeded in determining that Willkie privatcly approved
of the destroyer transfer and would not
make a campaign issue of it. 33 But the
Republican candidate failed to give the
administration a blank check in negotiations, even though he a, jJroved of the
ob;~ctive.34 He hesitated to commit
h .• nself completely while the entire subject was still cloaked with secrecy.
With the threat of partisan attack on
the exchange thus diminished. the
administration proceeded with negotiations. On 4 August Secretary of State
Cordell Hull met with Lothian and
discussed England's urgent need for the
destroyers. Hull reemphasized the legal
difficulties and probable time delays
inherent in such a transaction, but
reassured the' British Amhassador the
United States was I!;iving the matter
"attentive consideration."3 5 The same
day Hull sent to the President a memorandum relating to the sale of the
warships and auxiliary vessels. I t (~n
closed a proposed draft of a hill to be
offered in Congress which would specifically authorize such sale. This draft
had heen prepared on 2 August hy
Green II. Hackworth, Legal Adviser of
the Slate Department, and it had been
approved by Judge Townsend of the
Department of.J ustil'e. In di"l'usging thi"
proposed hill with Roosevelt, howeVl'r,
the President and II ull agreed that there
might be two ohjectlOns to sending it to
Congress-one, thiit it wouid ~tir up

.,

considerable. isolationist antagonism j the
other, that many weeks of diseuH.~ion
m igh t pass hdore it eCluld be
adopted. 36 Leaving the talks at this
preliminary stage, Hull left for Georgia
on vacation. His place was taken by
Under Secretary of State Sumner
Welles.
At this juncture several members of
the Cabinet, notably Attorney General
Robert Jackson, vigorously supported
by Secretary of War Stimson, persuaded
Roosevelt that he need not submit the
plan to Congress. Two weeks previously,
on 22 July, Benjamin Cohen had transmitted a memorandum to the President,
via Harold Ickes, which advocated similar action. At that time, however,
Roosevclt "frankly doubted if Cohen's
memorandum would stand up.,,3 7 As
time passed, however, these doubts dissolved under the increasing pressure
from Churchill, particularly with respect
to the possible loss of the British Fleet.
On 13 August the initial framework
of a tentative trade agreement was
developed during a conference between
the President, Secretaries Knox, Stimson, and Morgenthau, and Under Sreretary Welles. Hoosevell cabled this
proposal to Churchill the same day:
... I t is my helief that it may he
possihle to furnish to the Brith:h
Government as immediate a!'."isLance at least 50 destroyers ... it
would be necessary, in ·the event
that it proves possible to release
the material above mentioned,
that the British Government find
itself willing to take the following
two steps:
I. Agguranec on the purt of
the Prime lVlinister that in tlw
(Wl'nt thut the wull'rs of Grt'llt
Brituin il('('omc nnll'nahlt, for
British ships of war, the lall('r
would not he turned over to the
Germans or sunk, hut wonld he
gent to other parts of the Empire

527
for continued defense of the empire.
2. An agreement on the part
of Great Britain that the British
Government would authorize the
usc of Newfoundland, Bermuda,
the BlIhamas, JaJllaica, St. Lucia,
Trinidad and British Guiana as
naval and air hases by the United
States ... with the understanding
that the land necessary for the
above could be acquired by the
United States through purchase or
through a 99-year lease. 3 8
Churchill replied affirmativcly to
Roosevelt's proposal on 15 August:
We can meet both the points you
consider necessary to help you
with Congress and with others
concerned, but I am sure you will
not misunderstand me if I sav that
our willingness to do so m{lst he
conditioned on our being assured
that there will be no delay in
letting us have the ships. 3 9
Tlw groundwork for the rx("han~e
was now completed. During his 16
August press conference, Rooscvelt
made the first official statemcnt that
discussions were taking place: "The
United States Government is holding
eonverf'ations with the Government of
the British Empire with regard to acquisition of naval and air baf'es for the
defense of the Western Hemisphere and
especially the Panama Canal ... ,>4 0
No mention was madc of a pOf'f'ihle
deal for destroyers. These negotiations
continucd to be shrouded in sccrecy,
and several obstacles remained to be
surmounted before the trade could be
completed.
Obstacles. The fin;t major prohlem
hindering further progress conccrncd
the legality, under intcrnationallaw, for
a neutral state to transfer warships to a

belligerent nation and, even more important, whether the President could do
so without the approval of Congress. As
previously mentioned, both the Attorney General and his assistant, Benjamin Cohen, had assured Roosevelt that
such action was within his Icgal powers.
Realizing that suhmission of thc
proposed trade agreement to Congress
would arouse considerable isolationist
opposition and that time delays were
inevitable in such a procedure, the
President requested Attorney General
Jackson to prepare a formal ruling on
the subject. In respect to the naval
bases-destroyer exehange, Jackson was
asked to render a legal opinion on two
questions: (I) whether such an acquisition could he concluded hy the Prcsident as an executive agreement, and (2)
whether the President had authority to
alienate title to such ships, and, if so, on
what eonditions. 41
In an eight-page ruling delivered to
Rooscvelt on 27 August, the Attorncy
General reviewed the question in light
of existing statutes and advised the
President that: (1) the proposed arrangcment could be eoncluded as an
eXI:("utiv(! agn'clllcnt, and (~) there WllS
prcsidential powcr to transfer title and
possession of the proposcd considerations upon certification hy appropriate
5ta rr officers. 4 2
In hlllHling down this opinion, the
Attorney General held that the Prcsident was legally empowered to effect
the acquisition of the bases by exeeutive
agreement, first, because as constitutional Commander in Chief he was
responsible for the maintenance of all
agencies of national defense at their
highest efficiency; and second, because
the conduct of foreign relations was
vested in the President hy the Constitution as part of the executive functioll. 4 3
I II rrspert to the pertil"'"t provisions
of the Treaty of Washington (l87t) and
Article 8 of the Hague Convention XlI[
of 1907, which required that a neutral
government take measures to prevent
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the departure from its jurisdiction of
any vessel intended to engage in belligerent operations, if the vessel were specially adapted within the neutral's jurisdiction to warlike use, Jackson also had
an answer. He ruled that these restrictions did not apply "to vessels like the
overage destroyers, which were not
built, armed, equipped as, or converted
into, vessels of war with the intent that
they should enter the service of a
belligerent. ,>44
The second major snag in negotiations arose when Churchill balked at the
idea of a straight trade, destroyers for
bases. His immediate prohlem eoncerned domestic politics. He realized
that, ill order to faeilitate the exchange,
Roosevelt would allempt to make it
appear favorable to the United States.
Thus the Prime Minister ran the risk of
being held up as soft, as having been
outwitted by the Yankees. 4 5 In Churchill's words:
The President ... was of course
increasingly drawn to present the
transaction to his fellow-countrymen as a highly advantageous bargain wherehy immense securities
were gained in these dangerous
times by the United States in
return for a few flotillas of obsolete destroyers. This was indeed
true; but not exactly a convenient
statement for m·e. Deep feelings
were aroused in Parliament and
the Government at the idea of
leasing any part of these historie
territories, and if thc issue were
presented to the British as a naked
trading-away of British possessions for the sake of fifty destroyers it would certainly encounter
vehement opposition. I sought,
thereforc, to place the transaction
on the highest level, wherc indeed
it had a right to stand, b(~('mlse it
exprcssed and conserved the enduring common interests of the
English-speaking world. 46

By "place the transaction on the
highest level," Churchill meant an outright gift of the base sites to the United
States, ostensibly in return for a free
gift of the destroyers. On this basis,
negotiations proceeded.
Meanwhile, a statement by the British Prime Minister served further to
hinder progress. On 20 August Churchill
made a report to Parliament on the war
situation to date. In it he not only
omitted any reference to the destroyers,
but pointedly disassociated the bases
question from any other consideration.
While Roosevelt had hoped that the
Prime Minister would prepare his public
for acceptance of the American froposal, what he did was the reverse. 4
On 22 August Churchill reiterated his
position to Roosevelt: " ... I had not
contemplated anything in the nature of
a contract, bargain, or sale between us.
It is the fact that we had decided in
Cabinet to offer you naval and air
facilities off the Atlantic coast quite
independently of destroyers or any
other aid. ,>4 8
The next day Lothian cabled the
Prime Minister that Sumner Welles had
told him it was "ullerly impossihle for
the President to send the destroyers as a
spontaneous gift; the: could come only
as a quid pro quo. ,>4 The situation was
now at a temporary impasse.
At this juncture Secretary of State
Hull returned to Washington. On 23
August at a meeting of the Cahinet, the
President told him: "Our negotiations
with Britain on the bases and destroyers
have boglicd down. Please see what you
can do." 0 Almost immediately lIull
commenced a study of the difficulties
so far encountered. He reviewed in a
meeting with Lothian and Roosevelt the
entire progress of negotiations to date.
On the morning of 26 August, Hull
met with Green H. Hackworth, Legal
Adviser of the State Department, and
Judge Townsend of the Department of
Justice. The three men sought SOIlW
means to end the impasse. After a short
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discussion, Hackworth suggested that
there might be a compromise between
Churchill's desire for reciprocal gifts and
the legal position binding the President
to get something in return fpr the
destroyers. s 1 His idca was that Britain
could lease sites on Newfoundland and
Bermuda as outright gifts, while the
Caribbean bases were leased in consideration for the cession of 50 destroyers.
Hull transmitted this proposal to
the President, who gave it his tentative
approval. The following day, after a
Cabinet meeting, Roosevelt held a
special session with Secretaries Knox,
Stimson, and Hull. The four men went
over the initial draft carefully, made a
few changes in phraseology, and then
approved it. That night the proposal
was reviewed again by another group.
In addition to Hull and Knox, this
meeting was attended by Adm. Harold
Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, who
had to certify under the act of 28
June that the destroyers were not
essential to national defense, and Lord
Lothian.52 Once more the draft was
approved.
Lothian transmitted this proposal to
London. Churchill's 29 August reply
differed in only a few details from the
American version, notably in the addition of Antigua as a base site. The Prime
Minister stated:
We are prepared in friendship and
good will to meet your representatives forthwith, in order to consider the lease for ninety-nine
years of areas for the establishment of naval and air bases in the
following places:

Newfoundland
Bermuda
Bahamas
Jamaica

Antigua
St. Lucia
Trinidad
British Guiana

Subject to later settlements on
points of detail ... 53
In order to calm U.S. fears about the
disposition of the British Flee~ in case
of England's surrender, Churchill devised the following statement for release
to the American press:
You ask, Mr. President, whether
my statement in Parliament on
June 4, 1940, about Great Britain
never surrendering or scuttling her
Fleet "represents the settled policy
of His Majesty's Government." It
certainly does. I must, however,
observe that these hypothetical
contingencies seem more likely to
concern the German Fleet or what
is left of it than our own.5 4
Consummation. The obstacles to
consummation of the destroyer deal
were now largely overcome. A final text
of the agreement was prepared and
approved. Admiral Stark gave it his
certification. At the State Department a
message for the President to send to
Congress was drafted. Notes confirming
the destroyer-bases transaction were exchanged on 2 Septcmber betwecn Hull
and Lothian. On 3 September the President's message together with the destroyer-bases notes and tbe opinion hy
the Attorney General concerning the
legality of the transaction were communicated to Congress.
After nearly 4 months of negotiatiolls, the trade was completed.
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